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Abstract
Research on intergenerational mobility has often treated outcomes such as
schooling and earnings as being imperfectly transmitted from one parent
to a child. But because the characteristics of both parents are important in
shaping children’s outcomes, the way in which a generation of parents is
sorted into couples is likely to be a key determinant of intergenerational
persistence. Mating patterns are assortative—that is, individuals tend to
partner with people similar to themselves—and this is typically measured
by similarity of educational attainment. I present the first estimates of the
effect of assortative mating on intergenerational persistence of schooling
and earnings. I measure assortative mating as the rank correlation of cou-
ples’ educational attainment, that is, the degree to which the most highly-
educated men partner with the most highly-educated women. Using data
on parents and children in the United States, I find that assortative mating
explains about one quarter of the observed intergenerational persistence of
schooling and earnings.
∗Email: handyc@wlu.edu
1 Introduction
The question of why there is strong intergenerational persistence of schooling
and earnings is crucial for determining the degree to which intergenerational
persistence might be responsive to policy changes, and whether such policies
are desirable. Much of the literature on intergenerational persistence has treated
a family as having one parent. But because the characteristics—including fi-
nancial resources, genetics, attitudes, etc.—of both parents influence a child’s
outcomes, the way in which a group of parents is sorted into couples is likely to
be important in determining the degree of intergenerational persistence.
This paper studies the effect of educational assortative mating—the tendency
of individuals to marry people with educational attainment similar to their
own—on intergenerational persistence of schooling and earnings in the United
States. Using a statistical model consistent with canonical optimizing models of
intergenerational persistence, I show that more highly assortative mating will
increase the degree to which a parent’s schooling or earnings persist to a child.
In data on parents and children from the PSID, I show that assortative mating
can explain about one quarter of the observed intergenerational persistence of
schooling and earnings.
The simplest way in which assortative mating affects intergenerational per-
sistence is through a mechanical or statistical effect. Consider measuring the
degree of persistence in educational attainment from fathers to sons. Suppose
that parents’ educational attainment is determined before the couple has chil-
dren, and that both father’s education and mother’s education have positive ef-
fects on the child’s educational attainment. If highly educated fathers mate with
highly educated mothers, then the effect of mother’s education on the child’s ed-
ucation reinforces the effect of father’s education, and the correlation between
father’s education and son’s education will be high. On the other hand, if highly
educated fathers mate with mothers having low levels of education (a situation
known as negatively assortative, or disassortative, mating), then the effect of the
mother’s low education is to bring the child’s educational attainment closer to
the mean, so the correlation between father’s education and son’s education will
be lower. The statistical model in section 2 makes this point analytically.
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Another important way in which assortative mating affects intergenerational
persistence is through the labor supply decisions of parents. These labor supply
decisions will affect the family’s income and the financial resources available to
the parents for investment in their children’s human capital. In the household
labor supply model of Bredemeier and Juessen (2013), couples face a special-
ization decision over market work and household production. The wife’s hours
worked are increasing in her wage relative to her husband’s wage. If couples
are randomly matched, relative wages are lowest for wives of high-earning hus-
bands, so these wives work least, and the distribution of family income is more
compressed than the distribution of husbands’ earnings. This mitigates inter-
generational persistence between fathers and children. On the other hand, if
couples are perfectly matched, then wives of high-earning husbands work about
as much as wives of low-earnings husbands, and intergenerational persistence
from fathers to children is not lessened by the pattern of wives’ labor supply.
I measure educational assortative mating as the degree of rank correlation
between parents’ education levels. That is, mating is perfectly assortative when
the most highly-educated men partner with the most highly-educated women,
and the least-educated men partner with the least-educated women. I use Cen-
sus data to convert the number of years of education of each parent in my sample
to the parent’s percentile rank within the education distribution specific to their
sex and birth cohort. I then create an assortativity measure based on parents’
difference in percentile ranks. If mating were perfectly assortative on education,
then in each couple both parents would have the same percentile rank, so my
assortativity measure would be zero for each couple. As mating becomes less
assortative, the average rank distances within couples increase, and my assorta-
tivity measure becomes more negative.
This method of measuring educational assortative mating is a departure from
most previous research. Sociological literature tends to focus on the incidence
of homogamy—marriage between two people having the same number of years
of education—and heterogamy—marriage in which the partners’ educational at-
tainment differs (Schwartz and Mare, 2005). However, these measures may be
changed over time by differential trends in sex-specific education distributions.
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For example, suppose it were always the case that marriage was highly assorta-
tive with respect to education, in the sense that the most-educated men tended
to marry the most-educated women. In times when average educational attain-
ment was lower among women than men, then this would produce many cou-
ples with heterogamous marriages, in which the husband had more education
than the wife. If the education distributions of men and women then became
very similar, the incidence of homogamy, in which partners share the same level
education, would increase, even with no underlying changes in behaviors in the
marriage market.
More generally, my conception of assortative mating as based on the cor-
relation of partners’ education ranks reflects the fact that education is in part
a proxy for unobserved characteristics—often referred to collectively as “en-
dowments” in the literature on intergenerational persistence—such as cognitive
ability and non-cognitive skills. These unobserved characteristics are important
both for sorting patterns among a generation of parents and for how parents’
economic outcomes are transmitted to children. The sex-specific distributions of
these characteristics are likely to be much more similar than are the sex-specific
distributions of education. Therefore, using percentile ranks from sex-specific
education distributions to measure assortativity will reflect both patterns of as-
sortative mating on education, as well as unobserved assortative mating on im-
portant characteristics that are correlated with educational attainment.
In research on intergenerational transmission of education and earnings, the
most common measure of persistence is the slope coefficient from a simple re-
gression of a child’s outcome on a parent’s outcome. My measure of the effect
of assortative mating on intergenerational persistence is the degree to which
this slope coefficient is larger in families with higher assortativity. I regress the
child’s outcome on a parent’s outcome, parents’ assortativity, and an interaction
between the parent’s outcome and assortativity. If higher assortativity is corre-
lated with stronger intergenerational transmission of schooling or earnings, then
the coefficient on the interaction term will be positive.
A major challenge in interpreting the resulting estimates, of course, is that as-
sortativity is not randomly assigned. Suppose there is a group of parents with an
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especially strong preference for their children’s outcomes. This can cause inter-
generational persistence to be higher among this group, for two distinct reasons.
First, the strong preference for children’s outcomes may lead them to place more
importance on partnering with the best available mate, which increases assorta-
tive mating among the group. This raises intergenerational persistence among
the group, for the reasons explained above, and this is the effect I would like to
measure. Second, in the canonical model of intergenerational transmission with
one-parent families (Becker and Tomes, 1979), the share of the parent’s wealth
that is invested in the child’s human capital is increasing in the parent’s taste
for the child’s future earnings. Therefore, in this hypothetical group of parents,
intergenerational persistence would be higher, even before mating patterns are
considered.
To address this, I use control variables that are plausibly correlated with
preferences and are predetermined with respect to the parents’ mating deci-
sions. These controls include the parents’ birth cohort, birth region, race, and
education. The controls cannot be directly entered into the regression of child’s
outcome on parent’s outcome. Doing so would mean that the coefficient on par-
ent’s outcome represents a partial effect, conditional on controls, rather than a
total effect. Instead, I first purge the assortativity measure of the control vari-
ables in a first-step regression. The residuals from the first-step regression are by
construction uncorrelated with the controls. The second step is a regression of
child’s outcome on parent’s outcome, assortativity residuals from the first step,
and an interaction between parent’s outcome and assortativity residuals.
I find that assortativity is positively correlated with intergenerational per-
sistence. These results are more often statistically significant, and more stable
as control variables are added, for schooling persistence than for earnings per-
sistence. To estimate the overall effect of assortativity on intergenerational per-
sistence, I use the regression results to compare intergenerational persistence
at the observed average level of assortativity to the degree of persistence that
is predicted to prevail if couples were matched randomly. For both schooling
and earnings, I find that assortative mating explains about one quarter of the
observed level of intergenerational persistence.
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A large literature studies the level and causes of intergenerational transmis-
sion of schooling and earnings. See Solon (1999) and Black and Devereux (2011)
for reviews. The model of Becker and Tomes (1979) shows that the degree of
persistence reflects both the heritability of productive endowments and the fact
that wealthier parents invest more in their children’s human capital. Becker
(1991) notes that more assortative mating among the parent generation will in-
crease heritability of endowments and thus intergenerational earnings persis-
tence. This paper presents the first empirical evidence on the magnitude of this
effect.
Although previous research has not focused on the effects of assortative mat-
ing among the parents’ generation, some research has used differences in family
types to learn about the process of intergenerational persistence. For example,
Bjo¨rklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) and Liu and Zeng (2009) analyze differences
in persistence between adoptees and children raised with their biological par-
ents. Under some assumptions, this is informative about the relative importance
of pre-birth and post-birth factors. Chetty et al. (2014) show that earnings persis-
tence is lower in geographic areas of the U.S. where rates of single parenthood
are higher.
A small previous literature, including Chadwick and Solon (2002), Ermisch,
Francesconi, and Siedler (2006), and Holmlund (2008), has studied a separate
role in intergenerational persistence of assortative mating among the offspring
generation: a child’s choice of partner mechanically affects how similar the
child’s family income is to the family income of the child’s parents.
There is also a literature that studies the effect of marital sorting on inequality
of household income within a generation. If marriage is perfectly assortative,
the variance of household income will be higher than if couples were formed
through random mating. Recent studies of the magnitude of this phenomenon
include Schwartz (2010), Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar (2014), Greenwood et al.
(2014) and Pestel (2014). Along similar lines, Kremer (1997) and Ferna´ndez and
Rogerson (2001) use dynamic models, calibrated to U.S. data, to study the effect
of a permanent increase in assortative mating on steady-state inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The statistical model in
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section 2 shows how assortative mating increases intergenerational persistence.
Section 3 discusses the data sources, and section 4 is about my measure of assor-
tative mating. Section 5 details the empirical strategy, the results of which are
presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Statistical model
In this section I use a simple statistical model of intergenerational transmission
to clarify how assortative mating affects intergenerational persistence of human
capital and earnings. The model extends the framework of Lefgren, Lindquist,
and Sims (2012) to families with two parents and is consistent with the canoni-
cal model of Becker and Tomes (1979) showing how intergenerational transmis-
sion arises from optimizing behavior. Higher assortativity increases intergener-
ational persistence of human capital and earnings, and increases the variance of
human capital and earnings among the offspring generation. In the introduc-
tion, I discussed how assortative mating may affect intergenerational persistence
both mechanically and through changes in parents’ labor supply decisions. The
statistical model captures the first effect only, and does not attempt to model
household labor supply.
Each family consists of two parents, named f and m, and a child, c. The
earnings of each family member depend on human capital and market luck.
Human capital, h, includes education and genetic endowments, denominated
in dollar equivalents. Market luck, ν, is assumed to be uncorrelated with each
family member’s human capital and with other family members’ market luck.
The earnings equations are
Y f = µ+ h f + ν f ;
Ym = µ+ hm + νm;
Yc = µ+ hc + νc.
(1)
One contribution of Becker and Tomes (1979) was to show that parents in-
crease their children’s human capital and earnings in two major ways. First,
higher-income parents are able to invest more in their children’s human capital.
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Second, higher-income parents tend to have more favorable genetic endowments—
here, reflected in higher human capital—which are passed on to their children
through genetic and cultural inheritance. The equation describing production of
children’s human capital captures this insight:
hc = λ+ piY(Y f +Ym) + pih(h f + hm) + φc, (2)
where piY > 0 is parents’ propensity to invest financial resources in the child’s
human capital, pih > 0 is heritability of human capital, and φc is white noise.
Substituting this into the child’s earnings equation, (1), yields the classic
result on intergenerational earnings transmission first described in Becker and
Tomes (1979):
Yc = (λ+ µ) + piY(Y f +Ym) + pih(h f + hm) + φc + νc. (3)
Suppose that there is assortative mating on human capital. Becker (1991)
modeled assortative mating on both endowments and earnings, but assortativity
on human capital alone is plausible if matching occurs before labor market entry
or early enough in a career that values of market luck are not yet known. The
linear sorting equation that describes how parents match is
hm = h(1− r) + rh f + ψ, (4)
where h is average human capital, r is the correlation between parents’ human
capital, and the stochastic element ψ is assumed to be uncorrelated with h f .
To see how assortative mating affects intergenerational transmission, first
consider the most common measure of human capital persistence: the slope
coefficient in a simple regression of child’s human capital, hc, on father’s human
capital, h f . By substituting the earnings equations, (1), into the human capital
equation, (2), then using the sorting equation, (4), the slope estimator in the
simple regression converges to
plim βˆhc,h f = (1 + r)(piY + pih). (5)
As assortativity, r, increases, intergenerational transmission of human capital
also increases.
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Similarly, assortativity increases intergenerational transmission of earnings.
Consider a simple regression of child’s earnings, Yc, on father’s earnings, Y f . By
substituting the earnings equations, (1), into the earnings transmission equation,
(3), then using the sorting equation, (4), the slope estimator in the regression
converges to
plim βˆYc,Y f = (1 + r)(piY + pih)
Var(h f )
Var(Y f )
+ piY
Var(ν f )
Var(Y f )
. (6)
This measure of earnings persistence is increasing in assortativity, r.
Note that the magnitude of the effect of assortativity is larger for earnings
persistence in equation (6) than for human capital persistence in equation (5).
This is due to the child’s market luck, which generates regression to the mean
because it is realized after the parents’ investments in the child’s human capital
have been made. For the same reason, estimates of the effect of assortativity will
be noisier for earnings persistence than for schooling persistence. The standard
errors of the regression coefficients are increasing in the variance of the distur-
bance in the model, and the child’s market luck increases the residual variance
of earnings relative to the residual variance of human capital.
Assortative mating also has a mechanical effect of increasing the inequality
of family income among parents. If men and women with high education and
earnings potential tend to marry, then the variance of family income will be
higher than if couples were formed randomly. This has been studied recently by
Schwartz (2010), Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar (2014), and Greenwood et al. (2014).
Using the earnings equation, (1), and the sorting equation, (4), the variance of
parents’ family income is
Var(Y f +Ym) = (1 + r)2Var(h f ) + Var(ψ) + Var(ν f ) + Var(νm), (7)
which is increasing in assortativity among parents, r.
Some of this increased inequality will persist in the children’s generation, al-
though regression to the mean will eliminate part of it. The variance of earnings
among children is
Var(Yc) = (1 + r)2(piY + pih)2Var(h f ) + (piY + pih)2Var(ψ)
+ pi2Y
(
Var(ν f ) + Var(νm)
)
+ Var(φc) + Var(vc).
(8)
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3 Data
The sample of children and parents comes from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID), which began with a random sample of about 5,000 U.S. house-
holds in 1968. This sample was reinterviewed annually through 1997, and every
two years thereafter. Each round of the survey collects data on a wide range
of variables, including income from the previous calendar year. Children in
the original sample have been followed as they grow older and form their own
households, making the PSID a very common data source for studies of inter-
generational transmission of social and economic outcomes.
In constructing my sample, I first exclude the Survey of Economic Oppor-
tunity component of the sample (sometimes called the poverty sample) because
of strong concerns about the sample’s selection (Brown, 1996). I require that
the child and both biological parents be observed at least once beginning at age
25, so that reported schooling is likely to reflect final educational attainment.
Children whose parents were both in the survey at any time, and have a valid
schooling observation, will be included in my sample regardless of whether the
parents were married at the time of observation, and regardless of what hap-
pened to the parents’ relationship in the future. If it is not the case that both of
the child’s biological parents were observed—whether because the parents were
separated when the survey began, or one of the parents had died, etc.—then the
child is not in my sample. I also exclude children born before 1952, who were
older than 16 when the survey began in 1968, to avoid over-representing children
who remained at home longer. These restrictions yield a sample of 1,780 sons
and 1,810 daughters that are included in the results on schooling persistence.
Further restrictions are necessary for the earnings persistence sample. I drop
outlier earnings observations below $100 or above $150,000 in 1967 dollars, then
purge the remaining log earnings values of year effects. In a regression of child’s
log earnings on a parent’s log earnings, the year-to-year transitory variation in
the parent’s log earnings means that a single year’s observation of the parent’s
log earnings is a noisy estimate of the parent’s permanent log earnings. If this
transitory component of earnings is classical, there is attenuation bias in the
estimate of intergenerational earnings persistence (Solon, 1992). To address this,
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I follow previous research on earnings persistence by estimating the parent’s
permanent log earnings using a multi-year average of the parent’s annual log
earnings. In particular, I require that the parent’s earnings be observed five
times between ages 25 and 59. If more observations are available, I use the
five observations closest to age 40, as this is when annual log earnings are the
best estimate of lifetime permanent log earnings (Haider and Solon, 2006). Few
mothers in my sample have at least five earnings observations, so I examine only
father-child earnings persistence. These restrictions leave a sample of 1,052 sons
and 1,019 daughters to be used in the results on earnings persistence.
My measure of assortative mating, which is discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 4, is based on the similarity of parents’ percentile ranks within cohort-by-
sex-specific distributions of educational attainment. The PSID is far too small to
estimate these distributions with any precision. Instead, I use the IPUMS 1940–
2000 decennial Census files and the 2008–2012 ACS five-year file (Ruggles et al.,
2010) to estimate distributions of educational attainment at the cohort-by-sex
level. Each survey year is used to find the education distributions for cohorts
who were ages 35–44 at the time of the survey, which gives sex-specific educa-
tion distributions for birth cohorts from 1896 to 1977. The oldest parent in my
sample was born in 1902, and the youngest was born in 1970.
4 Measure of assortative mating
To exploit variation across families in the degree of assortative mating, I use
a family-specific measure of assortativity. Previous literature overwhelmingly
uses years of educational attainment to measure the degree of assortative mat-
ing, so one natural family-level measure of assortativity would be some function
of the difference between the parents’ levels of educational attainment. How-
ever, the distribution of education attainment differs between males and females,
and these differences have themselves changed over time (Acemoglu and Autor,
2011). As a result, a function of the difference between the parents’ levels of ed-
ucation would be hard to interpret, and the distribution might drift across birth
cohorts as education distributions changed, without any underlying change in
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the pattern of assortativity as defined by the rank correlation of couples’ educa-
tion. This point has been made independently, and solved differently, by Eika,
Mogstad, and Zafar (2014).
To measure assortative mating, then, I begin not with individual education
levels but with education ranks. Mating is perfectly assortative when the most
highly-educated men marry the most highly-educated women, so that ranks
within sex-specific education distributions are the same for both partners in
a couple. As the degree of assortativity decreases, the average difference in
couples’ percentile ranks increases. I use Census data to compute cohort-by-sex-
specific education distributions, then convert each PSID respondent’s reported
level of education, s, to their percentile rank within the appropriate education
distribution, k.
My family-specific measure of assortative mating is the negative of the squared
difference in the parents’ educational ranks:
ri = −(k fi − kmi )2. (9)
This index is constructed so that smaller negative values represent more assor-
tativity, up to a maximum of zero when the parents’ ranks within their respec-
tive education distributions are the same. The index is not affected by by sex
differences in education distributions or by changes over time in education dis-
tributions. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, ρ, is linearly related to the
cross-family mean of the assortativity index: ρ ≈ 1 + 6r.
Table 1 summarizes the degree of parents’ assortativity among the children
in the PSID who are eligible for the empirical analysis below. The table shows the
mean of the parents’ absolute difference in education ranks, |k fi − kmi |, and the
mean of my assortativity measure, ri = −(k fi − kmi )2. On average for the children
in my sample, parents’ education ranks are about 16 percentiles apart, and r =
−0.048. There are only small differences in parents’ assortativity between white
and black children, and again only small differences across three categories of
child’s completed education. Parents’ assortativity increased over time in this
sample: the average difference in parents’ education ranks was 16.4 percentiles
among children born in the 1950s, and 13.6 percentiles among children born in
the 1980s. This finding is consistent with Schwartz and Mare (2005), who find
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that the degree of assortative mating among new marriages was increasing from
1960–1995.
To give some context for these summary statistics, at the bottom of Table 1
I show the values of mean rank difference and mean assortativity under three
different sorting patterns. The simplest case is perfectly assortative mating, in
which each father is paired with a mother who has the same educational rank.
There are no differences in education ranks, so r = 0. If there is perfectly
disassortative (or perfectly negatively assortative) mating, then each father is
paired with a mother from the opposite position of the distribution of education
ranks: the highest-educated male mates with the lowest-educated female, and
so forth, so that kmi = 1− k fi for all i. In this case, one can show that the average
rank distance is 50 percentiles, and that r = − 13 . Finally, if matching is random,
then the bivariate random variable (k fi , k
m
i ) is uniformly distributed on the unit
square. One can show that the average rank distance is 33 percentiles, and that
r = − 16 .1 The observed level of assortativity, r = −0.048, can be interpreted as
showing that mating among parents is more than two thirds of the way toward
perfectly assortative when compared to the case of random matching.
5 Empirical strategy
In this section I describe a two-step procedure for estimating the effect of assor-
tativity on intergenerational persistence. While the procedure could be applied
to persistence of many traits, for concreteness I discuss intergenerational persis-
tence of earnings in this section. In section 6, I present results on persistence of
both schooling and earnings.
By far the most common summary measure of intergenerational earnings
persistence is the slope estimate from a simple regression in which the depen-
dent variable is child’s log earnings, yc, and the explanatory variable is father’s
log earnings, y f :
yci = a0 + a1y
f
i + e1i. (10)
1An additional advantage of my assortativity measure ri, relative to using the absolute value
of rank differences, is that in the case of random matching, r is exactly halfway between its value
in the two extreme cases. This is not the case when rank distances are used.
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Among developed countries, the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity,
aˆ1, ranges from a high of between 0.4 and 0.5 in the U.S. and UK to a low of
about 0.2 in Denmark, Finland, and Norway (Corak, 2013). One minus the inter-
generational earnings elasticity is interpreted as a measure of intergenerational
earnings mobility.
To study the effect of assortativity, r, controlling for some other variables, x,
on intergenerational persistence, it is tempting to extend this approach by re-
gressing child’s log earnings on father’s log earnings, assortativity, the controls,
and interactions between father’s log earnings and each of the other regressors,
producing the regression
yci = b0 + b1y
f
i + b2ri + x
′
ib3 + b4y
f
i ri + y
f
i x
′
ib5 + e2i, (11)
where b4 is the parameter of interest. However, this regression reveals how the
partial effect of father’s log earnings, controlling for the variables in x, varies
with assortativity. This is not the question I am trying to answer, and moreover
is difficult to interpret without some source of exogenous variation in father’s
log earnings.
Instead, I break up the estimation into two steps. In the first step, I regress
assortativity, r, on control variables such as father’s race and year of birth:
ri = α0 + x′iα1 + ε1i. (12)
The residuals from this regression, r˜, are by construction uncorrelated with the
control variables in x—that is, the assortativity residuals r˜ have been purged of
the controls. I then estimate the second step, a regression of child’s log earnings
on father’s log earnings, the assortativity residuals, and the interaction of these
residuals with father’s log earnings:
yci = β0 + β1y
f
i + β2r˜i + β3r˜iy
f
i + ε2i. (13)
Then β3 describes how the total effect of father’s log earnings varies with dif-
ferences in assortativity that are not explained by the control variables in x. If
assortativity increases intergenerational earnings persistence, then β3 > 0.
Other researchers have estimated the effects of regressors of interest on the
intergenerational earnings elasticity, but all have used a single-equation ap-
proach similar to (11), rather than the two-step procedure in this paper. For
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example, Mayer and Lopoo (2008) study whether the intergenerational earnings
elasticity in the U.S. varies with state government spending, conditional on state
fixed effects, and Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr (2009) estimate the effect of an
education reform in Finland on the intergenerational earnings elasticity, condi-
tional on child’s region and cohort indicators. These papers, then, describe how
the partial effect of father’s earnings, conditional on the control variables, varies
with the regressor of interest.
In the literature on measurement of the intergenerational earnings elasticity,
researchers face two major estimation challenges associated with mismeasure-
ment of child’s and father’s permanent log earnings. The first is that measure-
ment error and transitory variation in father’s log earnings, y fi , create attenua-
tion bias in the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity. This is commonly
addressed by taking a multi-year average of parents’ log earnings, which is the
strategy I follow here. See section 3 for details.
The second estimation challenge is that yearly earnings is a downwardly
biased measure of permanent earnings earlier in life, and an upwardly biased
measure of permanent earnings later in life (Grawe, 2006). This form of measure-
ment error is known as life cycle bias, and because it is non-classical, both error
in the explanatory variable, father’s permanent log earnings, and the depen-
dent variable, child’s permanent log earnings, may bias the estimated intergen-
erational earnings elasticity. The bias is smallest when earnings are measured
around age 40, because this is the age at which annual earnings are the best
estimate of lifetime permanent earnings (Haider and Solon, 2006). Therefore,
one way to address the bias is to begin from the second-step regression (13) and
add controls for a polynomial in father’s age relative to 40 at the time of earn-
ings measurement, age fi − 40, a polynomial in child’s age relative to 40 at the
time of earnings measurement, ageci − 40, and interactions between this latter
polynomial and father’s log earnings. Lee and Solon (2009) use a fourth-degree
polynomial, and I follow that choice in this paper.
Because observations on educational attainment are taken after individuals
are likely to have completed schooling, the schooling variables do not suffer
from life cycle bias or, of course, transitory variation. Measurement error of
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schooling may occur, but is likely to be much less severe than for earnings.
6 Results
Tables 2–5 present results on the role of assortative mating in the intergener-
ational persistence of educational attainment, as measured by years of school-
ing. For each of the four intergenerational links—father-son, mother-son, father-
daughter, and mother-daughter—there is strong evidence that higher assorta-
tivity among parents is associated with higher schooling persistence between
parent and child. This effect of assortativity is larger for mother-child persis-
tence than for father-child persistence.
In each table, the first column shows estimates of a simple regression of
child’s schooling on parent’s schooling. An additional year of parent’s schooling
is associated with an increase of about 0.4 years in the child’s schooling. In
column 2, the second step regression, (13), is run without purging assortativity
of any of the control variables. In each case, the interaction between assortativity
and parent’s schooling is positive and statistically significant at the one percent
level, indicating that more assortativity among parents is associated with higher
schooling persistence.
One way to estimate of the role of assortativity in intergenerational persis-
tence is to compare schooling persistence at the observed mean value of as-
sortativity, robs, to predicted schooling persistence at the value of assortativity
that would prevail if parents were randomly matched, rrandom. Because βˆ3 is
the estimated coefficient on the interaction of assortativity and parent’s school-
ing, the difference in persistence between a regime of random matching and
the observed sorting patterns is βˆ3(robs − rrandom). Recall from section 4 that
if matching among parents is random, then the mean values of assortativity is
rrandom = − 16 . The observed cross-family mean of assortativity varies slightly
depending on the sample, but is always roughly robs = −0.05.
In Table 2, the column 2 estimates indicate that intergenerational persistence
of schooling is 0.68× (−0.05− (−0.17)) = 0.08 higher under observed parent
sorting patterns than it would be if parents were matched randomly; this value is
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shown at the bottom of the column of regression estimates. This represents more
than one fifth the observed father-son persistence of 0.36, reported in column
1. The estimated role of assortativity in father-daughter schooling persistence,
shown in Table 3, is slightly larger. The results suggest that the observed levels of
assortative mating, compared to random mating, increase schooling persistence
by 0.10, which is about one quarter of the observed father-daughter persistence.
The role of assortativity in mother-child schooling persistence is even larger.
Using the results in Table 4, column 2, mother-son schooling persistence is 0.16
higher than it would be under random matching, so assortative mating accounts
for about 40 percent of the observed intergenerational persistence. According to
the estimates in Table 5, column 2, mother-daughter schooling persistence is 0.13
higher than it would be under random matching, so assortative mating accounts
for about one-quarter of the observed intergenerational persistence.
Of course, the results discussed so far should be viewed as providing de-
scriptive evidence, rather than isolating the causal effect of assortativity on in-
tergenerational persistence. The major issue is that closely-matched parents may
differ from other parents in many ways that impact intergenerational transmis-
sion. As discussed in the introduction above, among parents with especially
strong preferences for their children’s outcomes, there are two reasons to ex-
pect higher intergenerational persistence. First, these parents may search harder
for the best available mate, which will increase assortativity among the group.
That, in turn, increases intergenerational persistence, and is the type of effect I
want to measure. Second, even if sorting patterns were not different among this
group of parents compared to the overall population, their strong preference
for children’s outcomes would still lead to higher intergenerational persistence.
Part of the association between assortativity and intergenerational persistence,
then, may be driven by this latter effect, which does not operate through sorting
patterns among parents.
To the extent that there is important variation across marriage markets in
preferences about children’s outcomes, then one way to address this bias is to
use variation in assortativity within marriage markets, rather than all variation.
Therefore, I first control for interactions among birth decade, birth region, and
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race for each parent, because marriage markets are often roughly segmented
along these lines. These demographic indicators are good controls because they
are plausibly correlated with parents’ preferences and are determined before the
parents’ mating decisions.
The R2 from the first-step regression of assortativity on controls illustrates
how much of the total variation in assortativity is not used in the second-step
regression. Column 3 in Tables 2–5 shows that these demographic controls alone
explain about 30 percent of the variation in assortativity. The assortativity resid-
uals from this first step, then, use a subset of the total variation in assortativity
that is noticeably different from the uncontrolled regressions in column 2.
After regressing assortativity on these demographic controls, the residuals
from this first-step regression have been purged of correlation with the con-
trols. The estimates of the second-step regressions in column 3 show that the
demographic controls tend to increase the estimated effect of assortativity in
producing father-child schooling persistence, and decrease the estimated effect
of assortativity in producing mother-child schooling persistence. In all cases, the
estimated effect of assortativity remains statistically significant.
Next, I add indicators for each parent’s decile within their cohort-by-sex-
specific education distribution, to address the concern that both assortativity
and preferences may vary with parents’ schooling. Column 4 in Tables 2–5
shows that the estimated role of assortativity in schooling persistence increases
slightly compared to the more limited set of controls in column 3.
Tables 6 and 7 present the results on the role of assortative mating in father-
son and father-daughter earnings persistence. (Few women in the sample of
parents worked enough years to have a usable estimate of permanent earnings.)
The first column shows estimates of a simple regression of child’s log perma-
nent earnings on parent’s log permanent earnings. The estimated elasticity is
0.40 for father-son earnings persistence and 0.27 for father-daughter earnings
persistence, consistent with previous literature.
The statistical model in section 2 predicts that the role of assortativity in
earnings persistence will be smaller than its role in schooling persistence, be-
cause market luck adds variability to children’s earnings; compare equations (2)
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and (3). For the same reason, estimates of the role of assortativity in earnings
persistence are likely to be noisier than in the analysis of schooling persistence.
The estimates in column 2 of Tables 6 and 7 are consistent with this. I an-
alyze the role of assortativity in earnings persistence using the same methods
just discussed for schooling persistence. The estimated effects are positive, as ex-
pected, but smaller in magnitude and noisier compared to the results on school-
ing persistence. The observed sorting patterns among parents predict that the
father-son and father-daughter earnings elasticities are 0.04 higher than would
prevail under random matching.
As controls are added, the estimated effect of assortativity rises steadily
for both father-son and father-daughter earnings persistence. Only for father-
son persistence are the estimates sufficiently precise to be statistically signif-
icant. The controls explain a great deal of the variability across families in
assortativity—over one third of the variation can be explained by the demo-
graphic controls alone, and almost half is explained when the education decile
indicators are added. After the controls are added, assortative mating accounts
for about one-quarter of the observed earnings persistence between fathers and
either sons or daughters.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effect of assortative mat-
ing on intergenerational persistence of schooling and earnings. I conceptual-
ize educational assortative mating as the degree to which parents’ percentile
ranks within sex-specific education distributions are equally matched, that is,
the degree to which the most-educated men partner with the most-educated
women. This method is robust to sex differences in education distributions and
to changes in those education distributions over time, and naturally reflects the
fact that mating is likely to be assortative on many traits that are correlated
with education. I also show how a two-step estimation method can be used to
estimate the effect of a regressor of interest on intergenerational persistence.
I find than in the U.S., in families in which parents’ education ranks are
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more closely matched, intergenerational persistence is higher. I use these results
to predict levels of intergenerational persistence if mating were random instead
of positively assortative. Observed patterns of assortative mating can explain
about one quarter of intergenerational persistence of schooling and earnings.
It is interesting to consider whether these findings might have any implica-
tions for changes over time in intergenerational persistence or for understanding
cross-country differences in intergenerational persistence. The summary statis-
tics in Table 1 show that assortative mating among parents became stronger
between the 1950s and 1980s in the U.S. Using the results in Table 6 on how as-
sortativity affects earnings persistence between fathers and sons, the change in
average assortativity over this time period predicts an increase in the intergen-
erational earnings elasticity of 0.016, which is small compared to the estimated
elasticity of 0.40. Assortative mating can explain a significant fraction of the level
of intergenerational persistence of schooling and earnings, but observed changes
in assortativity over time do not predict large changes in intergenerational per-
sistence.
The potential implications of these results for cross-country differences in
persistence is less clear. It is well-documented that intergenerational earnings
persistence is higher in the U.S. than in many other developed countries (Solon,
2002; Corak, 2013). But because the measure of assortativity in this paper is
novel, it is unknown precisely how assortative mating in the U.S., as defined
here, compares to assortativity in other countries. However, some research using
other measures of assortative mating has shown that assortativity is higher in the
U.S. than in many other developed countries (Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles,
2005), notably including Britain, Canada, and the Nordic countries, for which
the best comparative evidence exists showing that intergenerational earnings
persistence is relatively high in the U.S. This raises the possibility, which may
be an interesting direction for future research, that some of the difference in
intergenerational persistence across countries may reflect differences in sorting
patterns among parents.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on educational assortative mating
Mean of rank distance Mean of assortativity
|k fi − kmi | ri = −(k
f
i − kmi )2
Overall 0.156 −0.048
By child’s race:
White 0.155 −0.047
Black 0.158 −0.051
Other 0.186 −0.071
By child’s education:
High school or less 0.158 −0.049
Some college 0.163 −0.050
College or more 0.150 −0.045
By child’s decade of birth:
1950s 0.164 −0.053
1960s 0.169 −0.054
1970s 0.153 −0.046
1980s 0.136 −0.037
1990s 0.151 −0.043
Alternative sorting patterns:
Perfectly assortative 0 0
Random matching 0.333 −0.167
Perfectly disassortative 0.500 −0.333
Notes: N = 4152. For a child in family i, k fi is the father’s percentile rank within the
distribution of completed education among males born in the same year as the father,
and kmi is the mother’s percentile rank within the distribution of completed education
among females born in the same year as the mother. The education distributions are es-
timated using decennial Census and ACS data. For precise definitions of the alternative
sorting patterns, see section 4.
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Table 2: Assortativity and father-son schooling persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step regression
Dependent variable: parents’ assortativity
Constant yes yes yes
Birth decade × birth region × race
indicators for each parent yes yes
Education decile indicators for each parent yes
R2 0.00 0.30 0.37
Second step regression
Dependent variable: child’s schooling
Assortativity residual × father’s schooling 0.68∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.26) (0.28)
Assortativity residual −8.85∗∗∗ −12.11∗∗∗ −13.70∗∗∗
(2.73) (3.00) (3.21)
Father’s schooling 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 9.12∗∗∗ 8.98∗∗∗ 9.00∗∗∗ 9.11∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Estimated effect of assortativity 0.08 0.11 0.12
Notes: N = 1780. Estimated effect of assortativity refers to the difference between predicted persistence at
the observed mean value of assortativity and predicted persistence at the value of assortativity that would
prevail if parents were randomly matched; see text for details. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and to clustering on PSID family ID. For tests of the null hypothesis that the regression
parameter is zero, ∗ indicates p < 0.10, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Assortativity and father-daughter schooling persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step regression
Dependent variable: parents’ assortativity
Constant yes yes yes
Birth decade × birth region × race
indicators for each parent yes yes
Education decile indicators for each parent yes
R2 0.00 0.29 0.32
Second step regression
Dependent variable: child’s schooling
Assortativity residual × father’s schooling 0.81∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.25) (0.26)
Assortativity residual −10.21∗∗∗ −11.63∗∗∗ −11.48∗∗∗
(2.47) (3.09) (3.17)
Father’s schooling 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 8.99∗∗∗ 8.90∗∗∗ 8.94∗∗∗ 9.00∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Estimated effect of assortativity 0.10 0.11 0.11
Notes: N = 1810. Estimated effect of assortativity refers to the difference between predicted persistence at
the observed mean value of assortativity and predicted persistence at the value of assortativity that would
prevail if parents were randomly matched; see text for details. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and to clustering on PSID family ID. For tests of the null hypothesis that the regression
parameter is zero, ∗ indicates p < 0.10, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Assortativity and mother-son schooling persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step regression
Dependent variable: parents’ assortativity
Constant yes yes yes
Birth decade × birth region × race
indicators for each parent yes yes
Education decile indicators for each parent yes
R2 0.00 0.30 0.37
Second step regression
Dependent variable: child’s schooling
Assortativity residual × mother’s schooling 1.36∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.39) (0.34)
Assortativity residual −17.56∗∗∗ −12.02∗∗ −13.11∗∗∗
(3.24) (5.07) (4.50)
Mother’s schooling 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 8.56∗∗∗ 8.69∗∗∗ 8.69∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31)
Estimated effect of assortativity 0.16 0.10 0.11
Notes: N = 1780. Estimated effect of assortativity refers to the difference between predicted persistence at
the observed mean value of assortativity and predicted persistence at the value of assortativity that would
prevail if parents were randomly matched; see text for details. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and to clustering on PSID family ID. For tests of the null hypothesis that the regression
parameter is zero, ∗ indicates p < 0.10, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Assortativity and mother-daughter schooling persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step regression
Dependent variable: parents’ assortativity
Constant yes yes yes
Birth decade × birth region × race
indicators for each parent yes yes
Education decile indicators for each parent yes
R2 0.00 0.29 0.32
Second step regression
Dependent variable: child’s schooling
Assortativity residual × mother’s schooling 1.07∗∗∗ 0.55∗ 0.63∗∗
(0.27) (0.30) (0.27)
Assortativity residual −13.70∗∗∗ −6.97∗ −8.20∗∗
(3.62) (4.13) (3.75)
Mother’s schooling 0.47∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 8.03∗∗∗ 8.10∗∗∗ 8.07∗∗∗ 8.05∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
Estimated effect of assortativity 0.13 0.07 0.08
Notes: N = 1810. Estimated effect of assortativity refers to the difference between predicted persistence at
the observed mean value of assortativity and predicted persistence at the value of assortativity that would
prevail if parents were randomly matched; see text for details. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and to clustering on PSID family ID. For tests of the null hypothesis that the regression
parameter is zero, ∗ indicates p < 0.10, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Assortativity and father-son earnings persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step regression
Dependent variable: parents’ assortativity
Constant yes yes yes
Birth decade × birth region × race
indicators for each parent yes yes
Education decile indicators for each parent yes
R2 0.00 0.36 0.43
Second step regression
Dependent variable: child’s earnings
Assortativity residual × father’s earnings 0.36 0.88∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.41) (0.40)
Assortativity residual 0.02 −0.04 −0.30
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28)
Father’s earnings 0.40∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Estimated effect of assortativity 0.04 0.10 0.12
Notes: N = 1052. All second-step regressions also include a constant and control for a quartic in father’s
age relative to 40, a quartic in child’s age relative to 40, and father’s earnings interacted with a quartic in
child’s age relative to 40, in order to address lifecycle biases (see section 5 for details). Estimated effect of
assortativity refers to the difference between predicted persistence at the observed mean value of assortativity
and predicted persistence at the value of assortativity that would prevail if parents were randomly matched;
see text for details. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and to clustering on
PSID family ID. For tests of the null hypothesis that the regression parameter is zero, ∗ indicates p < 0.10, ∗∗
indicates p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Assortativity and father-daughter earnings persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step regression
Dependent variable: parents’ assortativity
Constant yes yes yes
Birth decade × birth region × race
indicators for each parent yes yes
Education decile indicators for each parent yes
R2 0.00 0.37 0.43
Second step regression
Dependent variable: child’s earnings
Assortativity residual × father’s earnings 0.32 0.50 0.84
(0.62) (0.84) (0.85)
Assortativity residual −0.16 0.07 −0.08
(0.35) (0.50) (0.53)
Father’s earnings 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Estimated effect of assortativity 0.04 0.06 0.10
Notes: N = 1019. All second-step regressions also include a constant and control for a quartic in father’s
age relative to 40, a quartic in child’s age relative to 40, and father’s earnings interacted with a quartic in
child’s age relative to 40, in order to address lifecycle biases (see section 5 for details). Estimated effect of
assortativity refers to the difference between predicted persistence at the observed mean value of assortativity
and predicted persistence at the value of assortativity that would prevail if parents were randomly matched;
see text for details. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and to clustering on
PSID family ID. For tests of the null hypothesis that the regression parameter is zero, ∗ indicates p < 0.10, ∗∗
indicates p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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